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Abstract—Sensors (e.g., light, gyroscope, accelerometer) and sensing-enabled applications on a smart device make the applications
more user-friendly and efficient. However, the current permission-based sensor management systems of smart devices only focus on
certain sensors and any App can get access to other sensors by just accessing the generic sensor Application Programming Interface
(API). In this way, attackers can exploit these sensors in numerous ways: they can extract or leak users’ sensitive information, transfer
malware, or record or steal sensitive information from other nearby devices. In this paper, we propose 6thSense, a context-aware
intrusion detection system which enhances the security of smart devices by observing changes in sensor data for different tasks of
users and creating a contextual model to distinguish benign and malicious behavior of sensors. 6thSense utilizes three different
Machine Learning-based detection mechanisms (i.e., Markov Chain, Naive Bayes, and LMT). We implemented 6thSense on several
sensor-rich Android-based smart devices (i.e., smart watch and smartphone) and collected data from typical daily activities of 100 real
users. Furthermore, we evaluated the performance of 6thSense against three sensor-based threats: (1) a malicious App that can be
triggered via a sensor, (2) a malicious App that can leak information via a sensor, and (3) a malicious App that can steal data using
sensors. Our extensive evaluations show that the 6thSense framework is an effective and practical approach to defeat growing
sensor-based threats with an accuracy above 96% without compromising the normal functionality of the device. Moreover, our
framework reveals minimal overhead.
Index Terms—Sensor-based Threats, Smart Devices, Internet of Things, Machine Learning, Intrusion Detection.
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1 INTRODUCTION
SMART devices such as smartphones and smartwatcheshave become omnipresent in every aspect of human
life. Nowadays, the role of smart devices is not limited to
making phone calls and messaging only. They are integrated
into various applications from home security to health care
to military to smart city [1]–[3]. Since smart devices seam-
lessly integrate the physical world with the cyber world via
their sensors (e.g., light, accelerometer, gyroscope, etc.), they
provide more efficient and user-friendly applications [3]–
[5]. In a way, sensors are eyes, ears, skin of the device to
the physical world as five sensing organs are to the human
beings.
While the number of applications using different sensors
is increasing and new devices offer more sensors, the pres-
ence of sensors have opened novel ways to exploit the smart
devices [6]. Attackers can exploit the sensors in multiple
ways [6]: They can trigger an existing malware on a device
with a simple flashlight [7]; they can use a sensor (e.g.,
light sensor) to leak sensitive information; using motion
sensors, attackers can record or steal sensitive information
from other nearby devices (e.g., computers, keyboards) or
people [8], [9]. They can even transfer a specific malware
using sensors as a communication channel [6]. Such sensor-
based threats become more serious with the rapid growth of
Apps utilizing many sensors [10].
In fact, these sensor-based threats highlight the flaws of
existing sensor management systems used by smart devices.
Specifically, Android sensor management system relies on
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permission-based access control, which considers only a few
sensors (i.e., microphone, camera, and GPS)1. Android asks
for access permission (i.e., with a list of permissions) only
while an App is being installed for the first time. Once this
permission is granted, the user has no control over how the
listed sensors and other sensors (not listed) will be used
by the specific App. Moreover, using non-listed sensors is
not considered as a violation of security and privacy in
Android. For instance, any App is permitted to access to
motion sensors by just accessing the sensor API. Access to
motion sensors is not controlled in Android.
Existing studies have proposed enhanced access control
mechanisms for some of the sensors, but these enhance-
ments do not cover all the sensors of a smart device [12],
[13]. Some proposed solutions introduced trusted paths
on top of the existing security mechanisms for controlling
information flow between sensors and Apps, but these are
also App-specific solutions and depend upon explicit user
consent. Thus, introducing additional permission controls
for sensors of a smart device will not mitigate the risk of all
sensor-based threats as they are App-specific and address
only data leakage risks. Some attacks may not abuse sensors
directly; instead, they may use sensors as side-channels to
activate another malware [6]. Albeit useful, existing security
schemes overlook these critical threats which directly im-
pact the security and privacy of the smart device ecosystem.
Moreover, although sensors on smart devices seem to work
independently from each other, a task or activity on a smart
device may activate more than one sensor to accomplish the
task. Hence, it is necessary to secure all the different sensors
1. IOS, Windows, and Blackberry also have similar permission-based
sensor management systems. In this work, we focus on Android due to
its open-source nature and high market share [11]
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2on a smart device and consider the context of the sensors in
building any solution against the sensor-based threats.
In order to address the sensor-based threats, in this
paper, we present a novel intrusion detection (IDS) frame-
work called 6thSense, as a comprehensive security solution
for sensor-based threats for smart devices. The proposed
framework is a context-aware IDS and is built upon the
observation that for any user activity or task (e.g., texting,
making calls, browsing, driving, etc.), a different, but a
specific set of sensors becomes active. In a context-aware
setting, the 6thSense framework is aware of the sensors
activated by each activity or task. 6thSense observes sensors
data in real time and determines the current use context of
the device according to whether the current sensor use is
malicious or not. 6thSense is context-aware and correlates
the sensor data for different user activities (e.g., texting,
making calls, browsing, etc.) on the smart devices and learns
how sensors’ data correlates with different activities. As
a detection mechanism, 6thSense observes sensors’ data
and checks against the learned behavior of the sensors. In
6thSense, the framework utilizes several Machine Learning-
based detection mechanisms to catch sensor-based threats
including Markov Chain, Naive Bayes, and a set of other
ML algorithms (e.g., PART, Logistic Function, J48, LMT, Ho-
effding Tree, and Multilayer Perception). In this paper, we
present the design of 6thSense on different Android devices
(smartphone and smart watch) because of its open-source
nature, large market share [11], and rich set of sensors.
To evaluate the efficiency of the framework, we tested it
with data collected from real users (100 different users, 16
different typical daily activities for smartphone and smart
watch [14] including 153600 and 307200 different event-
state information, respectively). We also evaluated the per-
formance of 6thSense against three different sensor-based
threats and finally analyzed its overhead. Our evaluation
shows that 6thSense can detect sensor-based attacks with
an accuracy and F-Score over 96%. Also, our evaluation
shows a minimal overhead on the utilization of the system
resources. Note that, this work is an extension of our pre-
vious work [12]. We significantly improved the framework
from our prior work and implemented 6thSense on smart
watch and smart phone. We also evaluated the performance
with new user data and analyzed the performance overhead
in further detail.
Contributions: In summary, the main contributions of
this paper are threefold—
• First, the design of 6thSense, a context-aware IDS to detect
sensor-based threats utilizing multiple machine learning
based models from Markov Chain to Naive Bayes to LMT.
• Second, the extensive performance evaluation of 6thSense
with real user experiments over 100 users for different
smart devices (smartphone and smart watch).
• Third, testing of 6thSense against three different sensor-
based threats.
Organization: The rest of the paper is organized as
follows: we give an overview of sensor-based threats and
existing solutions in Section 2. In section 3, we briefly
discuss the Android’s sensor management system. Adversary
model, design features, and assumptions for 6thSense are
briefly discussed in Section 4. Different detection techniques
used in our framework are described in Section 5. In Section
6, we provide a detailed overview of 6thSense including
its different components and in Section 7, we evaluate its
effectiveness by analyzing different performance metrics.
Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 8.
2 RELATED WORK
Sensor-based threats [6] on smart devices have become more
prevalent than before with the use of different sensors such
as user’s location, keystroke information, etc. Several works
[15], [16] have investigated the possibility of these threats
and presented different potential threats in recent years.
Some interesting sensor-based threats are explained below.
One of the most common threats is keystroke inference
in smart devices. When a user types in the keyboard, motion
sensor readings (i.e., accelerometer and gyroscope) change
accordingly [17]. As different keystrokes yield different, but
specific values in motion sensors, typing information on on-
screen keyboard can be inferred from an unauthorized sen-
sor such as motion sensor data or its patterns collected either
in the device or from a nearby device can be used to extract
users’ input in smart devices [18]–[21]. The motion sensor
data can be analyzed using different techniques (e.g., ma-
chine learning, frequency domain analysis, shared-memory
access, etc.) to improve the accuracy of inference techniques
such as [9], [22]–[25]. Another form of keystroke inference
threat can be performed by observing only gyroscope data.
Smart devices have a feature of creating vibrations while a
user types on the touchpad. The gyroscope is sensitive to
this vibrational force and it can be used to distinguish dif-
ferent inputs given by the users on the touchpad [26]–[28].
Recently, ICS-CERT also issued an alert for accelerometer-
based attacks that can deactivate any device by matching
vibration frequency of the accelerometer [10], [29].
Light sensor readings also change while a user types on
smart devices; hence, the user input in a smart device can
be inferred by differentiating the light sensor data in normal
and typing modes [30]. The light sensor can also be used as
a medium to transfer malicious code and trigger message
to activate a malware [7]. The audio sensor of a smart
device can also be exploited to launch different malicious
attacks (e.g., information leakage, eavesdropping, etc.) on
the device. Attackers can infer keystrokes by recording tap
noises on touchpad [31], record conversation of users [32],
transfer malicious code to the device [15], or even replicate
voice commands used in voice-enabled different Apps like
Siri, Google Voice Search, Amazon echo, Google Smart Home
etc. [33]. Cameras of different smart devices can also be
used to covertly capture screenshot or video and to infer
information about surroundings or user activities [34]–[36].
GPS of a smart device can be exploited to perform a false
data injection attack on smart devices and infer the location
of a specific device.
Solutions for sensor-based threats: Although researchers
identified different sensor-based threats in recent years, no
complete security mechanism has been proposed that can
secure sensors of a smart device. Most of the proposed se-
curity mechanisms for smart devices are related to anomaly
detection at the application level which are not built with
any protection against sensor-based threats [37]. On the
other hand, different methods of intrusion detection have
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3been proposed for wireless sensor networks (WSN) [38],
but they are not compatible with smart devices. Xu et al.
proposed a privacy-aware sensor management framework
for smartphones named Semadroid [13], an extension to the
existing Android sensor management system where users
could monitor sensor usage of different Apps and invoke
different policies to control sensor access by active Apps
on a smartphone. Maiti et al. proposed a real-time activity
detection framework to identify user activity on a smart
device using motion sensor and allow motion sensor access
based on the detected activity [9]. Petracca et al. introduced
AuDroid, a SELinux-based policy framework for Android
smartphones by performing behavior analysis of micro-
phones and speakers [39]. AuDroid controls the flow of in-
formation in the audio channel and notifies users whenever
an audio channel is requested for access. An extension of
this work is AWARE, an authorization framework to secure
privacy-sensitive sensors from malicious applications [40].
AWARE considers both application requests and user inter-
face to identify malicious user inputs in operation bindings
for microphone and camera. Jana et al. proposed DARKLY, a
trust management framework for smartphones which audits
applications of different trust levels with different sensor
access permissions [41]. Darkly scans for vulnerability in
the source code of an application and tries to modify the
run-time environment of the device to ensure the privacy of
sensor data.
Differences from the existing solutions: Though there is
no direct comparable work to compare 6thSense with, differ-
ences between existing solutions and our framework can be
noted as follows: The main limitation of Semadroid [13] is
that the proposed solution is only tested against a similar
type of attack scenario (information leakage by a back-
ground application). Semadroid also does not provide any
extensive performance evaluation for the proposed scheme.
Finally, this work depends on user permissions to fully
enforce an updated policy on the sensor usage which is
vulnerable as users might unknowingly approve the sensor
permissions for malicious Apps. Real-time activity detection
proposed by Maiti et al. considers motion sensors to identify
user activity on a smart device which is only effective
against keystroke inference [9]. In Darkly [41], the proposed
framework is not tested against any sensor-based threats.
Audroid presented a policy enforced framework to secure
only the audio channels of a smart device. Albeit useful,
similar to the others, this work does not consider other
sensor-based threats, either. More recent work AWARE also
considers selective sensors (e.g., camera and microphone) to
identify malicious sensor accesses of the applications [40].
Compared to these prior works, 6thSense provides a comprehensive
coverage to all the sensors in a smart device and ensures security
against different types of sensor-based threats with high accuracy.
3 SENSOR MANAGEMENT IN SMART DEVICES
Modern smart devices perform app-based operations which
create a many-to-many relationship between sensors and
Apps. Smart devices use more than one sensor to perform
a task and hence, it is impractical to install an independent
management system for each sensor. Smart device operating
systems (OS) address this requirement by implementing
centralized sensor management systems to manage and
Fig. 1: Android Sensor Management Architecture.
ensure secure data acquisition from all the sensors. In this
section, we discuss sensor management systems of smart
device OSes and articulate important deficiencies of the
existed sensor management systems.
Sensors in Smart Devices: Most of the current smart device
OSes offer permission-based sensor management system to
control sensor access and data flow. According to the asso-
ciated permissions imposed by the OSes, sensors in smart
devices can be categorized in two groups - permission-
imposed and no permission-imposed sensors.
• Permission-imposed Sensor (PS): Permission-imposed sen-
sors are those which need explicit user permission to
be accessed by an App. In smart devices, GPS, camera,
and microphone are considered as permission-imposed
sensor.
• No Permission-imposed sensors (NPS): No-permission-
imposed sensors can be defined as sensors that do not
need any user permission explicitly to be accessed by
an App. Smart devices can have a wide range of no
permission-imposed sensors such as accelerometer, gyro-
scope, proximity sensor, light sensor, etc.
Sensor Management Systems in Smart Devices: To un-
derstand sensor management systems in smart devices, we
briefly explain sensor management in Android OS. In Fig-
ure 1, we present how Android handles access to different
sensors by Apps (installed by the user) and system Apps (in-
stalled automatically by Android). Whenever an App wants
to access sensors, it sends a request to SensorManager via
Software Development Kit (SDK) API which then registers
the App to a corresponding sensor [42]. If more than one
App tries to access the same sensor, the SDK API runs a
multiplexing process which enables different Apps to be
registered in the same sensor. Hardware Abstraction Layer
(HAL) works as an interface to bind the sensor hardware
with the device drivers in Android. HAL has two parts:
Sensors.h works as HAL interface and Sensors.cpp works
as the HAL implementation. Through the HAL library,
different applications can communicate with the underlying
Linux kernel to read and write files associated with sensors.
Also, the user permission for sensor access permission is
declared inside the AndroidManifest.xml file of an App and
once the user accepts the permission, that App can have
access to the corresponding permission-imposed sensors
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4and other no-permission imposed sensors even without any
explicit approval from the users.
Limitations of Current Sensor Management Systems:
Present versions of different smart device OSes (i.e., An-
droid, iOS, Windows OS, Blackberry OS, etc.) do not com-
prise of any security mechanism to manage the information
flow from sensors or among them. Most of the OSes offer
a permission-based sensor management system to control
sensor access and data flow between the application and
sensor. OSes ask for user-permission for only selective set of
sensors (e.g., GPS, camera, and microphone) at the time of
installation or first use of an App. Users may grant access
to sensitive sensors implicitly without knowing the actual
intents of the App. Moreover, an App can get access to any
no permission-imposed sensors by just accessing the sensor
API. Also, one task may need more than one sensor, but
protecting only one sensor is not a viable design. The lack
of ability to secure the information flow between the sensors
and Apps and a holistic view into the utilization of sensors
can lead to different malicious scenarios like information
leakage, eavesdropping, etc.
4 ADVERSARY MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this section, we discuss different threats that may abuse
sensors to execute malicious activities on a smart device.
Different design features and assumptions are also ex-
plained in this section.
Adversary Model: For this work, we consider the follow-
ing sensor-based threats similar to [6]:
• Threat 1-Triggering a malicious App via a sensor. A malicious
App can exist in the smart device which can be triggered
by sending a specific sensory pattern or message via
sensors.
• Threat 2-Information leakage via a sensor. A malicious App
can exist in the device which can leak information to any
third party using sensors.
• Threat 3-Stealing information via a sensor. A malicious App
can exist in the device which can exploit the sensors of a
smart device and start stealing information after inferring
a specific device mode (e.g., sleeping).
In this paper, we cover these three types of malicious
sensor-based threats. To build our adversary model, we
consider any component on a smart device that interacts
with the physical world as a sensor [39]. We designed
specific malware to represent above-mentioned threats and
test our proposed framework against these malware.
Design Assumptions and Features: In designing a com-
prehensive security scheme like 6thSense for sensor-based
threats, we note the following design assumptions and
features:
• Context Awareness: The main feature of 6thSense is context
awareness which refers to the ability to sense the physical
environment and adapt its operations accordingly in re-
alistic cases [43]. 6thSense builds a context-aware model
by observing the sensors’ behaviors on a smart device
in different usage scenarios. When a user is performing a
task on a smart device, several sensors (i.e., accelerometer,
gyroscope, light sensor, etc.) may remain active. This
active state of different sensors is not constant and can
change over time. This shifting in sensor’s state over time
Fig. 2: Context-aware model for 6thSense.
should be considered correctly to understand the context
of an activity. 6thSense divides the total execution time of
an activity into smaller times and observes the sensors’
states (on/off) over a short time span. Thus, whenever
a sensor state is changed, 6thSense can understand the
context and take a decision according to the context. For
example, while a user is walking with a smartphone on
his hand, several sensors (i.e., accelerometer, gyroscope,
light sensor, etc.) remain active. If we divide the time of
the activity in smaller times, we can see different sets of
sensors active for different sensor states (Figure 2). In this
way, 6thSense considers all device states to understand
the context of the activity and differentiate between be-
nign and malicious activities.
• Sensor co-dependence: A sensor in a smart device is nor-
mally considered as an independent entity on the device.
Thus, one sensor does not know what is happening in
another sensor. However, in this work, given an activity,
we consider sensors as co-dependent entities on a device
instead of independent entities. The reason for this stems
from the fact that for each user activity or task on a smart
device, a specific set of sensors remains active. For exam-
ple, if a user is walking with a phone in hand, motion
sensors (i.e., gyroscope, accelerometer), the light sensor,
GPS will be active. On the contrary, if the user is walking
with the phone in the pocket or bag, instead of the light
sensor, the proximity sensor will remain active. Thus, a
co-dependent relationship exists between sensors while
performing a specific task. Each activity uses different,
but specific set of sensors to perform the task efficiently.
Hence, one can distinguish the user activity by observing
the context of the sensors for a specific task. 6thSense uses
the context of all the sensors to distinguish between nor-
mal user activities and malicious activities. In summary,
sensors in a smart device are individually independent, but per
activity-wise dependent and 6thSense considers the context
of the activities in its design.
• Adaptive sensor sampling: Different sensors have different
sampling frequencies. To monitor all the sensor data for
a specific time, a developed solution must consider and
sample the sensor data correctly. 6thSense considers sam-
pling the sensor data over a certain time period instead
of individual sensor frequencies which mitigates any pos-
sible error in processing of data from different sensors.
6thSense collects each sensor data separately and samples
the data according to their corresponding frequencies.
These sample data are merged together to build contexts
of different user activities in smart devices.
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5• Faster computation: Modern high precision sensors on
smart devices have high resolution and sampling rate.
As a result, sensors provide large volume of data even
for a small time interval. A solution for sensor-based
threats should quickly process any large data from differ-
ent sensors in real time while ensuring a high detection
rate. To address this, we use different machine learning
algorithms as detection techniques of 6thSense which are
proven simple and fast techniques.
• Real-time monitoring: 6thSense provides real-time monitor-
ing to all the sensors which mitigates the possibility of
data tempering or false data injection on the device.
• Configurability: 6thSense is configurable to provide dif-
ferent needs and flexible deployments. For example,
6thSense offers both online and offline training mode for
different machine learning detection techniques to reduce
power consumption.
5 DETECTION TECHNIQUES: THEORETICAL
FOUNDATION
In this section, we describe the theoretical foundation of
the detection techniques used in 6thSense. For the context-
aware IDS in 6thSense, we utilize several different ML-based
techniques including Markov Chain, Naive Bayes and, a
set of other ML algorithms (e.g., PART, Logistic Function,
J48, LMT, Hoeffding Tree, and Multilayer Perception) to
differentiate between normal and malicious behavior on a
smart device.
As explained in Section 4, we consider the context
awareness of user activities in a smart device which shows
state transition and sensor co-dependence feature in a smart
device. The Markov Chain model can illustrate these prop-
erties of the smart device’s sensors accurately based on
different user activities in the transition matrix. Another
advantage of using Markov Chain model is that it is easy
to build the model from a large dataset and computational
requirements are modest which can be met by resource-
limited devices. On the other hand, the Naive Bayes model
can build multiple activity contexts from sensor data and
identifies whether a test dataset belongs to a user activity
or a malicious activity. The Naive Bayes model uses the
sensor co-dependence feature to build the activity context
and classifies data accordingly. In addition to this, the Naive
Bayes technique is chosen for its fast computation rate,
small training dataset requirement, and ability to modify it
with new training data without rebuilding the model from
scratch.
Apart from the Markov Chain and the Naive Bayes
model, other ML techniques are also common in malware
detection because of their high accuracy rate [44], [45]. We
also investigate how other ML algorithms perform in build-
ing a context-aware model from sensor data and detecting
sensor-based threats on a smart device. Our main purpose
is to check whether popular ML algorithms can understand
and build an effective context-aware model for sensor-based
threats. A discussion of these approaches in the context
of 6thSense is given below. The efficacy of these different
approaches utilized in 6thSense is analyzed in Section 7.
Fig. 3: Markov Chain model for 6thSense.
5.1 Markov Chain-Based Detection
Markov Chain model can be described as a discrete-time
stochastic process which denotes a set of random variables
and defines how these variables change over time. There
are two main assumptions for Markov Chain model: (1)
Probability distribution of the state at time t+1 depends on
the state at time t only. Here, the state refers to the overall
condition of the stochastic process. (2) A state transition
from previous timestamp (t) to next timestamp (t+1) is inde-
pendent of time. Markov Chain can be applied to illustrate
a series of events where what state will occur next depends
only on the previous state. In our study, a series of events
represents user activity and state represents condition (i.e,
values, on/off status) of the sensors in a smart device
(Figure 3). We can represent the probabilistic condition of
Markov Chain as in Equation 1 where Xt denotes the state
at time t [46].
P (Xt+1 = x|X1 = x1, X2 = x2..., Xt = xt) = P (Xt+1 = x|Xt = Xt),
when, P (X1 = x1, X2 = x2..., Xt = xt) > 0.
(1)
In our study, we observe the changes of condition of a
set of sensors as a variable which changes over time. The
condition of a sensor indicates whether the sensor value
is changing or not from a previous value in time. Let us
assume S denotes a set which represents current conditions
of n number of sensors. So, S can be represented with
S = {S1, S2, S3, ..., Sn}, where S1, S2, S3, ..., Sn = 0 or 1.
For a specific time, t, we consider the combination of all the
sensors’ conditions in the smart device as the state of our
model. As we consider change in a sensor’s condition as
binary output (1 or 0, where 1 denotes that sensor value is
changing from previous instance and 0 denotes that sensor
value is not changing), the number of total states of our
model will be exponents of 2. For example, if we consider
the total number of sensors in set S is 10, the number of
states in our Markov Chain will be 210 and the states can be
represented as a 10 bit binary number where each bit will
represent the state of a corresponding sensor. For this, pij
denotes the probability that the system in a state j at time t+1
given that system is in state i at time t. If we have n number
of sensors and m = 2n states in our model, Markov Chain
can be constructed by the following transition probability
matrix:
P =

p11 p12 p13 . . . . . . p1m
p21 p22 p23 . . . . . . p2m
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
pm1 pm2 pm3 . . . . . . pmm
 (2)
The transition probability matrix of this Markov Chain
can be constructed by observing the transitions from
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6one state to another state for a certain time. Assume
that, system’s states are X0, X1, . . . , XT at a given time
t = 0, 1, . . . , T . We can represent the transition probability
matrix as follows:
Pij =
Nij
Ni
, (3)
where, Nij = the number of transition from Xt to Xt+1
where Xt in state i and Xt+1 in state j; Ni = the number
of transition from Xt to Xt+1, where Xt in state i and Xt+1
in any other state. The initial probability distribution of this
Markov Chain can be represented as follows:
Q =
[
q1 q2 q3 . . . . . . qm
]
(4)
where qm is the probability that the model is in state
m at time 0. Probability of observing a sequence of states
X1, X2, . . . , XT at a given time 1, . . . , T can be computed
using the following equation:
P (X1, X2, . . . , XT ) = qx1
T∏
2
PXt−1Xt (5)
For 6thSense, instead of predicting the next state, we de-
termine the probability of occurring a transition between
two states at a given time. We train our Markov Chain
model with a training dataset collected from real users and
build the transition matrix accordingly. Then, we determine
sensor working condition for time t and t+1. Let us assume
a and b are sensor’s state in time t and t+1. We determine
the probability of transition from state a to b which can be
found by looking up in the transition matrix and calculating
P(a,b). As the training dataset consisted of sensor data from
benign activities, we can assume that if transition from state
a to b is malicious, the calculated probability from transition
matrix will be zero.
5.2 Naive Bayes Based Detection
The Naive Bayes model is a simple probability estimation
method which is based on Bayes’ method. The main as-
sumption of the Naive Bayes detection is that the presence
of a particular sensor condition in a task/activity has no
influence over the presence of any other feature on that par-
ticular event. The probability of each event can be calculated
by observing the presence of a set of specific features.
Assume p(x1, x2) is the general probability distribution
of two events x1, x2. Using the Bayes rule, we can have the
following equation:
p(x1, x2) = p(x1|x2)p(x2), (6)
where p(x1|x2) = Probability of the event x1 given that event
x2 will happen. Now, if we have another variable, c, we can
rewrite Equation 7 as follows:
p(x1, x2|c) = p(x1|x2, c)p(x2|c). (7)
If knowledge of c is sufficient enough to determine the
probability of event x1, we can state that there is conditional
independence between x1 and x2 [47]. So, we can rewrite
the first part of Equation 8 as p(x1|x2, c) = p(x1|c), which
modifies Equation 8 as follows:
p(x1, x2|c) = p(x1|c)p(x2|c). (8)
In 6thSense, we consider users’ activity as a combination
of n number of sensors (Figure 4). Assume X is a set
which represents current conditions of n number of sensors.
We consider that conditions of sensors are conditionally
Fig. 4: Naive Bayes model for 6thSense.
independent (See Section 4.2), which means a change in
one sensor’s working condition has no effect over a change
in another sensor’s working condition. As we explained
earlier, the probability of executing a task depends on the
conditions of a specific set of sensors. So, in summary,
although one sensors’ condition does not control another
sensor’s condition, overall probability depends on all the
sensors’ conditions. For example, if a person is walking with
his smartphone in his hand, the motion sensors (accelerom-
eter and gyroscope) will change. However, this change will
not force the light sensor or the proximity sensor to change
its condition. Thus, sensors in a smart device change their
conditions independently, but execute a task together. From
Equation 9, we can have a generalized formula for this
context-aware model [47]:
p(X|c) =
n∏
i=1
p(Xi|c). (9)
In our contextual activity-oriented model, we have a set of
training data for users’ activities. Assume that B represents
a set which denotes m numbers of user activities. We can
determine the probability of a dataset X to be classified as a
user activity using the following equation:
P (Bi|X) = P (X|Bi)P (Bi)
P (X)
, (10)
where i = 1, 2, . . . , m. As the sum of all the conditional
probabilities for X will be 1, we can have the following
equation which will lead to Equation 12—
m∑
i=1
P (Bi|X) = 1. (11)
P (Bi|X) = P (X|Bi)P (Bi)∑m
i=1 P (X|Bi)P (Bi)
. (12)
This calculated conditional probability then is used to
determine the benign user activity or malicious attacks
in 6thSense. In this way, we compute the probability of
occurring an activity over a certain period of time.
We divide the sensor data into smaller time values (1
second) and calculate the probability of each instances to
infer the user activity. The calculated probability per second
data is then used in the expected value theorem to calculate
total probability. If the probability of the first instance is p1
with a value of a1, probability of the second instance is p2
with a value of a2 and so on, up to value an, the expected
value can be calculated by the following formula:
E[N ] =
a1p1 + a2p2 + a3p3 + . . . . . .+ anpn
a1 + a2 + . . . . . .+ an
. (13)
As all the values of a1, a2, ... ..., an are equally likely,
this expected value becomes a simple average of cumulative
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7probability of each instances. We infer the user activity by
setting up a configurable threshold value in the 6thSense
framework and checking whether calculated value is higher
than the threshold or not. If it is lower than the threshold
value, a malicious activity is occurring in the device.
5.3 Other ML-based Detection Techniques
In addition to the Markov Chain and the Naive Bayes mod-
els above, there are other machine learning algorithms (such
as PART, Logistic Function, J48, LMT, Hoeffding Tree, and
Multilayer Perception) that are very popular for anomaly
detection schemes because of their fast computation and
easy implementation.
In the alternative detection techniques, we used four
types of ML-based classifier to build a context-aware ana-
lytical model for 6thSense. The following briefly discusses
these classifiers and our rationale to include them:
Rule-based Learning. Rule-based ML works by identifying
a set of relational rules between attributes of a given dataset
and represents the model observed by the system [48].
The main advantage of the rule-based learning is that it
identifies a single model which can be applied commonly
to any instances of the dataset to make a prediction of
outcome. As we train 6thSense with different user activities,
the rule-based learning provides one model to predict data
for all the user activities which simplifies the framework.
For 6thSense, we chose, PART algorithm for the rule-based
learning.
Regression Model. Regression model is widely used in
data mining for its fast computation. This type of classifier
observes the relations between dependent and independent
variables to build a prediction model [49]. For 6thSense, we
have a total 11 attributes where we have one dependent
variable (device state: malicious/benign) and ten indepen-
dent variables (sensor conditions). Regression model ob-
serves the change in the dependent variable by changing the
values of the independent variables and build the prediction
model. We use the logistic regression model in 6thSense,
which also yields with high accuracy against conventional
Android malware [49].
Neural Network. Neural network is another common
technique that is utilized by researchers for malware de-
tection. In neural network techniques, the relation between
attributes of dataset is compared with the biological neurons
and a relation map is created to observe the changes for
each attribute [50]. We chose Multilayer Perceptron algorithm
for training the 6thSense framework as it can distinguish
relationships among non-linear dataset.
Decision Tree. Decision tree algorithms are predictive
models where decision maps are created by observing the
changes in one attribute in different instances [51]. These
types of algorithms are mostly used in a prediction model
where output can have a finite set of values. For 6thSense,
we utilized and tested three different decision tree algo-
rithms (J48, LMT (Logistic Model Tree), and Hoeffding tree) to
compare the outcome of our framework.
6 6THSENSE FRAMEWORK
In this section, we provide a detailed overview of our pro-
posed context-aware IDS framework, 6thSense, for detecting
sensor-based threats on smart devices. As illustrated in Fig-
ure 5, 6thSense has three main phases: (1) data collection, (2)
data processing, and (3) data analysis. In the Data Collection
phase, we use a custom Android App to collect the sensor
data for different user activities and the collected sensor data
are then processed in the Data Processing phase. In Phase 3,
the collected data is fed into detection models and the end
result indicates whether the current state of the device is
malicious or not. The following sub-sections briefly describe
these three phases.
6.1 Data Collection Phase
In this phase, 6thSense collects data from different sensors
of a smart device. There can be multiple sensors in a smart
device. 6thSense considers nine sensors in total to identify
different user activities using a sensor-rich Android device.
The sensors selected are accelerometer, gyroscope, light
sensor, proximity sensor, GPS, audio sensor (microphone
and speaker), camers, and headphone. The chosen sensors
are then categorized into two following categories.
No-permission-imposed sensors in 6thSense: For 6thSense,
we chose four no-permission imposed sensors (i.e., ac-
celerometer, gyroscope, light, proximity sensors). We can
also refer these sensors as data-oriented sensors in the con-
text of 6thSense because values provided by these sensors
need to be observed to infer user activities. For example,
accelerometer’s and gyroscope’s values change with motion
and they give values on X, Y, and Z axes. To detect whether
a sensor is activated or not for a specific activity, one needs
to observe values of these sensors.
Permission-imposed sensors in 6thSense: We chose five
permission-imposed sensors to build the context-aware
model (microphone, GPS, speaker, camera, and headset) of
6thSense. The conditions of these sensors can be represented
by their logical states (on/off status) for different user
activities. Hence, we also referred to these sensors as logic-
oriented sensors in the context of 6thSense. For example,
microphone has only two values to identify users’ activity:
on and off. So, it can be represented with 0 or 1 to detect if
the camera is on or off correspondingly.
To collect the data and logical values from sensors,
we built a custom Android App and 6thSense used this
in the data collection phase. In Android, this App uses
sensoreventlistener API to log numerical values of the data-
oriented sensors. On the other hand, the App determines
the state of the sensor and logs 0 or 1 if the sensor is
on or off, respectively. This App uses the user permission
to use the microphone, GPS, and camera to record the
working conditions of these sensors. For GPS, we consider
two datasets - either GPS is turned on or not and either
location is changing or not. In total, six different logic state
information for five aforementioned permission-imposed
sensors are collected by this App.
Note that 6thSense considers different typical daily hu-
man activities [52] that involve the smart devices (e.g., smart
watch, smart phone, etc.) to build the contextual model.
These activities include walking, talking, interacting (play-
ing games, browsing), driving (as driver and passenger).
Furthermore, the number of activities is configurable in
6thSense and is not limited to aforementioned examples. As
also explained in the evaluation of 6thSense, a total of seven
and nine typical daily activities are selected for smart watch
and smart phone respectively as they are considered as com-
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8mon user activities [14]. 6thSense collects these data using
the App for different users to train the framework which is
then used to distinguish the normal sensor behavior from
the malicious behavior. In summary, the aforementioned
App collects data from eight different sensors for different
typical user activities. 6thSense observes sensor state (com-
bination of working conditions (i.e., values, on/off status)
of different sensors) in a per second manner for each user
activity. Each second of data for user activity corresponds to
512 state information from eight different sensors.
6.2 Data Processing Phase
In the second phase of the framework, 6thSense organizes
the data to use. As different sensors have different frequen-
cies on the smart device, the total number of readings of
sensors for a specific time period is different. For example,
the accelerometer and gyroscope of LG Watch Sport have
a sampling frequency of approximately 418 Hz and 32 Hz,
respectively while the light sensor has a sampling frequency
of 5 Hz. Thus, the data collected in Phase 1 needs to be
sampled and reorganized. 6thSense observes the change
in the sensor condition in each second to determine the
overall state of our device and from this per second change,
6thSense determines the activity of users. For this reason,
6thSense takes all the data given by a single sensor in a sec-
ond and calculates the average value of the sensor reading.
This process is only applicable for the data oriented sensors
as mentioned earlier. Again, the data collected from the App
is numerical value as given by the sensor. However, for
the detection model, 6thSense only considers the condition
of the sensors. 6thSense observes the data collected by the
aforementioned App and determines whether the condition
of sensors is changing or not. If the sensor value is changing
from the previous value in time, 6thSense represents the
sensor condition as 1 and 0 otherwise. The logic state infor-
mation collected from the sensors need to be reorganized,
too as these data are merged with the data collected from
the collected values from the other sensors to create an
input matrix. We consider the condition of the sensors to
be the same over time and organize the data accordingly.
The reorganized data generated from the aforementioned
App are then merged to create the training matrices.
6.3 Data Analysis Phase
In the third, 6thSense uses different ML-based detection
techniques introduced in the previous section to analyze the
data matrices generated in the previous phase.
For the Markov Chain-based detection, 6thSense uses
75% of the collected data to train 6thSense and generate the
transition matrix. This transition matrix is used to determine
whether the transition from one state to another is appro-
priate or not. Here, state refers to generic representation of
all the sensors’ conditions on a device. For testing purposes,
we have two different data set — benign activities or trusted
model and malicious activities or threat model. The trusted
model consists of 25% of the collected data for different
user activities. We tested the trusted model to ensure the
accuracy of the 6thSense framework in detecting benign
activities. The malicious activities are built from performing
the attack scenarios mentioned in Section 4. 6thSense calcu-
lates the probability of a transition occurring between two
Fig. 5: Overview of 6thSense.
states at a given time and accumulates the total probability
to distinguish between normal and malicious activities.
To implement the Naive Bayes-based detection tech-
nique, 6thSense uses the training sessions to define different
user activities. In 6thSense, seven typical user activities are
selected in total for smart watch as listed in Table 3. In
addition to these user activities, we consider walking with
smart device in pocket and making a video call as typical
user activities to test 6thSense in smart phone. 6thSense
uses ground truth user data to define these activities. Using
the theoretical foundation explained in Section 5, 6thSense
calculates the probability of a test session to belong to any
of these defined activities. As 6thSense considers one second
of data in each computational cycle, the total probability up
to a predefined configurable time interval (in this case five
minutes) is calculated. This calculated probability is used
to detect malicious activities from normal activities. If the
computed probability for all the known benign activities
is not over a predefined threshold, then it is detected as
a malicious activity.
For the other alternative machine-learning-based detec-
tion techniques, 6thSense uses WEKA, a data mining tool
which offers data analysis using different machine learning
approaches [53].
7 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF 6THSENSE
In this section, we evaluate the efficiency of the proposed
context-aware IDS framework, 6thSense, in detecting the
sensor-based threats on smart devices (smartphone and
smart watch). We tested 6thSense with the data collected
from different users for benign activities and adversary
models described in Section 4. As discussed earlier, 6thSense
considers three sensor-based threats: (1) a malicious App
that can be triggered via a light or motion sensors, (2) a
malicious App that can leak information via audio sensors,
and (3) a malicious App that steals data via audio sen-
sors. Furthermore, we measured the performance impact of
6thSense on the devices and present a detailed results for
the efficiency of the 6thSense framework on both a smart
watch and smart phone.
7.1 Training Environment and Dataset
In order to test the effectiveness of 6thSense, we imple-
mented it on both a sensor-rich Android-based smart watch
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type
Name
Model
(Smart Watch | Smart Phone)
Specification
(Smart Watch | Smart Phone)
No-permission imposed
sensors
Accelerometer
Bosch BMI160 Acceleration Sensor |
MPU6500 Acceleration Sensor
78.4532 m/s2, 417.67 Hz, 0.01 mA |
19.6133 m/s2, 203.60 Hz, 0.25 mA
Gyroscope
Bosch BMI160 Gyroscope Sensor |
MPU6500 Gyroscope Sensor
17.453293 rad/s, 31.95 Hz, 0.01 mA |
8.726646 rad/s, 203.60 Hz, 6.1 mA
Light Sensor
APDS-9306 Light Sensor |
TMG399X RGB Sensor
30000 lux, 5 Hz, 0.11 mA |
600000 lux, 5.62 Hz, 0.75 mA
Proximity Sensor
LG Wear Detection Sensor |
TMG399X proximity sensor
1V, 0.15 mA | 8V, 0.75 mA
Permission-imposed sensors
Microphone
Qualcomm Snapdragon Wear 2100
built in microphone | Qualcomm
Snapdragon 801 Processor built
in microphone
120 dB, .12 mA | 86 dB, .75 mA
Speaker
Qualcomm Snapdragon Wear 2100
built in speaker | Qualcomm
Snapdragon 801 Processor built
in speaker
90 dB, .18 mA | 110 dB, 1 mA
Camera N/A | Samsung S5K2P2XX N/A | 12 megapixels, 30 fps, 4.7 mA
TABLE 1: Sensor list of LG Watch Sport and Samsung Galaxy S5 Duos smartphone used in experiment.
and smartphone. We used the LG Watch Sport as a reference
Android smart watch with Android Wear version 2.0 to collect
sensor data for different typical user activities. We chose
this Android device as the LG watch sport is a second
generation, stand-alone Android wearable that provides a
rich set of sensors. A list of sensors of LG Watch Sport is
given in Table 1. As discussed earlier, we selected 7 different
typical user activities or tasks to collect user data (Table 2).
These are typical basic activities with the smart watches
that people usually do in their daily lives [14]. The user
activities/tasks are categorized in two categories as generic
activities and user related activities.
Generic activities are the activities in which the sensor
readings are not affected by the smart device users. Sleeping
wearing smart watch, driving with the smart watch using
GPS as a navigator, and driving with smart watch in hand
are three generic activities that were considered in this
work. Basically, in the generic activities, sensors’ data are
not affected by different users since users do not interact
with the smart watch directly. For example, if a user is
sleeping, sensors activity will be irregular depending on
sleeping pattern. There will be less movement detected in
the device and sensor data will be changed accordingly. For
user-related activities, in which the sensor readings may be
affected by the user, we identified four different activities
including walking, playing games, browsing, and making
voice calls via smart watch.
For implementing and evaluating the performance of
6thSense on smartphone, we chose Samsung Galaxy S5 Duos
with Android OS version 7.1.2 (Android N) which provides
a broad range of sensors. Samsung currently holds approxi-
mately 23.3% of total market share of smartphones [54] and
is the largest Android operated smartphone manufacturer
which motivates to implement 6thSense on Samsung smart-
phone. In addition to user activities used in the smart watch
data collection, we considered two more user-related activ-
ities (walking with the device in pocket/bag and making
video calls) for testing 6thSense on the smartphone.
6thSense was tested by 100 different individuals (50
smart watch users and 50 smartphone users) while the sen-
sor data was collected from the smart watch and the smart-
phone. We note that our study with human subjects was ap-
proved by the appropriate Institutional Review Board (IRB)
and we followed all the procedures strictly in our study.
To train and test 6thSense on the smart watch, we collected
200 sets of data for four user-related activities for the smart
watch where each dataset comprised of 300 seconds of data
from the selected sensors mentioned in Section 6. We also
collected three sets of data for each general activity. We
asked the different users to perform the same activity to
ensure the integrity for different tasks. We also asked the
users to perform the tasks naturally without any influence
of the lab environment. Users performed these tasks in a
real-life workplace and outdoor in a natural environment.
Additionally, users chose their preferred place, walking
routes, and apps in the entire data collection process. For ex-
ample, to collect data in walking scenario, users chose their
preferred walking routes both inside their workplace and
outside environment. Note that each five minutes of the data
collected for user-related and generic activities corresponds
to 300 events with 512 different states. So, a total of 153,600
different event-state information were analyzed by 6thSense
for a user activity. For testing 6thSense on a smartphone, we
collected data from 50 different individuals for nine different
activities. We considered nine different sensors to build the
context-aware model and each dataset depicted 300 events
with 1024 different states and a total of 307,200 event-state
information [12].
For the malicious dataset, we created three different at-
tack scenarios considering the adversary model mentioned
in Section 4. For Threat 1, we developed two different An-
droid Apps which could be triggered using the light sensor
and motion sensors on the smart watch. We also created
the same malicious Android app for the smart phone. To
perform the attack described in Threat 2, we developed a
malware that could record conversations as audio clips and
playback after a specific time to leak the information. This
attack scenario included both the microphone and speaker
on the smart watch and smart phone. We developed another
version of this app which could record conversations as
audio clips in smartphone using a connected smart watch.
Also, for Threat 3, we developed a malicious App that could
scan all the sensors and if none of the sensors were changing
their working conditions, the malicious App could open
up the microphone and record audio clips surreptitiously.
For Threat 3, we developed another version for smart
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devices with camera (e.g., smartphone) where a malicious
App can scan all the sensors of a device and if device
was inactive, the malicious App could activate camera and
record videos covertly. We developed an updated version
of this attack which could start recording via microphone
in a smart watch if the connected smartphone was inactive.
This version of the app could bypass the security feature
introduced on Android P [55]. In summary, we created 10
different malware that could perform malicious activities
in Android-powered smart phone and smart watch. We
collected 18 different datasets (a total of 62,850 event-state
information) from these three attack scenarios to test the
efficacy of 6thSense against these adversaries in a smart
watch.
In order to test 6thSense, we divided the collected real
user data into two sections as it is a common practice [56].
75% of the collected benign dataset was used to train the
6thSense framework and 25% of the collected data along
with malicious dataset were used for testing purposes. For
the Markov Chain-based detection technique, the training
dataset was used to compute the state transitions and to
build the transition matrix. On the other hand, in the Naive
Bayes-based detection technique, the training dataset was
used to determine the frequency of sensor condition changes
for a particular activity or task. As noted earlier, for the
smart watch, there were seven activities for the Naive Bayes
technique. We split the data according to their activities
for this approach. For the analysis of the other ML-based
Task Category Task Name
Generic Activities
1. Sleeping
2. Driving as driver
3. Driving as passenger
User-related Activities
1. Walking with smart watch
in hand
2. Playing games
3. Browsing
4. Making phone calls
5. Walking with device in
pocket/bag†
6. Making video calls†
† Only considered for smart phone.
TABLE 2: Typical activities of users on a smart device [14].
approaches, the data in benign and malicious classes were
used to train and test 6thSense using 10-fold cross validation
for different ML algorithms.
7.2 Performance Metrics
In the evaluation of 6thSense, we utilized the following
six different performance metrics: Recall rate (sensitivity
or True Positive rate), False Negative rate, Specificity (True
Negative rate), False Positive rate, Accuracy, and F-score.
True Positive (TP) indicates number of benign activities that
are detected correctly while true negative (TN) refers to the
number of correctly detected malicious activities. On the
other hand, False Positive (FP) states malicious activities
that are detected as benign activities and False Negative
(FN) defines number of benign activities that are categorized
as malicious activity. F-score is the performance metric of
a framework that reflects the accuracy of the framework
by considering the recall rate and specificity. These perfor-
mance metrics are defined as follows:
Recall rate (TP Rate) =
TP
TP + FN
, (14)
False negative rate =
FN
TP + FN
, (15)
Precision rate (TN rate) =
TN
TN + FP
, (16)
False positive rate =
FP
TN + FP
, (17)
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
, (18)
F − score = 2 ∗Recall rate ∗ Precision rate
Recall rate+ Precision rate
. (19)
In addition to the aforementioned performance metrics, we
considered Receiver Operating Characterstic (ROC) curve
and Precision Recall Curve (PRC) as other performance
metrics for 6thSense. As our collected dataset is imbalanced
(number of benign events is higher than the malicious
events), the accuracy of the framework can be influenced by
the dataset. To address data imbalance problem in 6thSense,
we used PRC as a performance metric which considers data
imbalance and reflects the base-rate fallacy correctly [57].
7.3 Evaluation of Markov Chain-Based Detection
In the Markov Chain-based detection technique, we ques-
tion whether the transition between two states (sensors’
on/off condition in each second) is expected or not. In
the evaluation, we used 66 testing sessions in total for the
smart watch, among which 51 sessions were for the benign
activities (both generic and user-related activities) and the
rest of the sessions were for the malicious activities. For
evaluation in the smartphone, we have 80 testing sessions
in total (65 benign sessions). A session is composed of a
series of sensory context conditions where a sensory context
condition is the set of all available sensor conditions (on/off
state) for different sensors. As discussed earlier in Section 6,
a sensor condition is a value indicating whether the sensor
data is changing or not. In this evaluation, the sensory
context conditions were computed every one second. For
Markov Chain-based detection, we referred each sensory
context condition as state of the device of that particular
moment. 6thSense provides both online and offline training
method to reduce performance overhead of the resource-
constrained devices. As the highest battery life is 430 mAh
for LG watch sport, training with different user data will
consume more power which will increase power-accuracy
trade-off of our framework; hence, we chose offline training
method [58]. For the test dataset, we used the transition
matrix generated from the training period to determine
whether transition from one state to another is malicious
or not. We observed that in real devices, sometimes some
sensor readings would be missed or real data would not be
reflected due to hardware or software imperfections. And,
real malicious Apps would cause consecutive malicious
states on the device. Therefore, to overcome this, we also
kept track of number of consecutive malicious states and
used it as a threshold after which the session was considered
as malicious. Table 3 displays the evaluation results asso-
ciated with the Markov Chain-based detection technique.
When the threshold for consecutive malicious states is 0, i.e.,
when no threshold is applied, the accuracy is just 77% and
FNR is as high as 33%. With increasing the threshold value,
the accuracy first increases up to 97% then starts decreasing.
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Smart Watch Smart Phone
Threshold† Recall FN Precision FP Accuracy F-score Recall FN Precision FP Accuracy F-score
0 0.66 0.33 1 0 0.77 0.79 0.62 0.38 1 0 0.68 0.76
1 0.77 0.22 1 0 0.85 0.87 0.86 0.14 1 0 0.88 0.92
2 0.88 0.11 1 0 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.04 1 0 0.96 0.97
3 0.97 0.02 0.98 0.01 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.02 1 0 0.98 0.98
5 0.99 0.001 0.89 0.11 0.96 0.94 1 0 0.9 0.1 0.98 0.94
6 1 0 0.84 0.16 0.95 0.92 1 0 0.8 0.2 0.96 0.89
† Number of consecutive malicious state is considered as threshold
TABLE 3: Performance evaluation of Markov Chain based model.Smart Watch Smart Phone
Threshold† Recall FN Precision FP Accuracy F-score Recall FN Precision FP Accuracy F-score
55% 1 0 0.53 0.47 0.96 0.69 1 0 0.6 0.4 0.93 0.75
57% 1 0 0.6 0.4 0.96 0.75 1 0 0.7 0.3 0.95 0.82
60% 1 0 0.67 0.33 0.97 0.80 1 0 0.7 0.3 0.95 0.82
62% 0.96 0.04 0.67 0.33 0.94 0.79 1 0 0.7 0.3 0.95 0.82
65% 0.89 0.11 0.67 0.33 0.87 0.76 0.94 0.06 0.7 0.3 0.9 0.80
67% 0.86 0.14 0.67 0.33 0.85 0.75 0.88 0.12 0.7 0.3 0.85 0.78
† Calculated expected probability is considered as threshold.
TABLE 4: Performance evaluation of Naive Bayes model.
The logical cut-off threshold should be three consecutive
malicious occurrences which has both accuracy and F-score
over 97%. In Table 3, different performance indicators for
Markov Chain based detection are also presented. We can
observe that FN and TN rates of Markov Chain-based
detection decrease as the threshold of consecutive malicious
states increases. Again, both accuracy and F-score reach to a
peak value with the threshold of three consecutive malicious
states on the device. From Figure 6, we can see that FP rate
remains zero while TP rate increases at the beginning. The
highest TP rate without introducing any FP case is over 88%.
After 88%, it introduces some FP cases in the system. For the
cut-off threshold of three consecutive malicious occurrences,
TP rate of 6thSense increases over 97% with FP rates as low
as 0.01%.
Table 3 also depicts evaluation of Markov chain model
on the smartphone. Similar to the smart watch, TP rate and
FP rate increase with consecutive malicious occurrences and
FN and TN decrease with the threshold on a smartphone.
The plausible cut-off threshold should be three consecutive
malicious occurrences which is the same for the smart
watch. The peak accuracy and F-score can be achieved for
this threshold value which is over 98%. From Figure 6, we
can also notice that the highest possible TP rate without
introducing any FP cases is 98%. Figure 6b shows PRC curve
for Markov Chain-based detection on both the smartwatch
and the smart phone. We can see that for both the smart
watch and the smartphone, area under PRC are approxi-
mately 1 which is ideal result for our imbalanced dataset.
In summary, Markov Chain-based detection in 6thSense can
acquire accuracy over 97% and auPRC approximately 1 with
low FP rates (1.43%) for both the smart watch and the
smartphone.
7.4 Evaluation of Naive Bayes-based Detection
In the Naive Bayes-based detection technique, 6thSense
calculates the probability of a session to match it with each
activity defined in Section 7.1. Here, 6thSense checks the
calculated probability of an activity from dataset against
a threshold to determine the correct activity. If there is
no match for a certain sensor condition with any of the
activities, 6thSense detects the session as malicious. Table 4
shows the evaluation results.
For the smart watch, for a threshold value of 55%, FN
rate is zero. However, FPR is too high (47%), which lowers
F-score of the framework. For a threshold of 60%, FPR
decreases while FNR is still zero. In this case, accuracy is
97% and F-score is 80%. If the threshold is increased over
65%, it reduces the recall rate which affects accuracy and
F-score. The evaluation indicates that the threshold value of
60% provides an accuracy of 97% and F-score of 80%. Also,
From Figure 6, one can observe the relation between FPR
and TPR of Naive Bayes-based detection. For FPR larger
than 0.33, TPR becomes 1.
For Naive Bayes-based detection on the smartphone, we
considered nine activities in total (three general activities
and six user-related activities) [12]. From Table 4, we can
observe that TP rate FP rates decrease with the threshold
value while FN and TN increase. When the threshold is 60%,
the peak accuracy (95%) and F-score (82%) are achieved
for the smartphone. Precision-Recall curve for Naive Bayes
model is given in Figure 6d. We can notice that PRC curve is
more irregular compared to Markov Chain-based approach.
Calculated auPRC for Naive Bayes-based approach is 0.7 for
(a) ROC curve for Markov Chain (b) PRC curve for Markov Chain (c) ROC curve for Naive Bayes (d) PRC curve for Naive Bayes
Fig. 6: ROC curve and PRC curve of different detection techniques on smart watch (—–) and smart phone (—–).
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Smart Watch Smart Phone
Algorithms Recall FN Precision FP Accuracy F-score Recall FN Precision FP Accuracy F-score
PART 0.98 0.012 0.69 0.30 0.98 0.80 0.99 0.01 0.65 0.35 0.99 0.79
Logistic Function 0.99 0.01 0.35 0.65 0.97 0.49 0.99 0.01 0.28 0.72 0.99 0.43
J48 0.99 0.01 0.71 0.29 0.99 0.81 0.99 0.01 0.65 0.35 0.99 0.79
LMT 0.99 0.01 0.95 0.05 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.01 0.93 0.07 0.99 0.96
Hoeffding Tree 1 0 0.07 0.93 0.99 0.12 1 0 0.06 0.94 0.99 0.11
Multi-layer Perceptron 0.99 0.01 0.65 0.35 0.98 0.81 0.99 0.01 0.69 0.31 0.99 0.82
TABLE 5: Performance of other different machine learning based-detection techniques tested in 6thSense.
the smart watch and the smartphone, both of which indicate
less efficient method for imbalanced dataset.
7.5 Evaluation of Alternative Detection Techniques
In alternative detection techniques, we used other super-
vised machine learning techniques to train the 6thSense
framework for both the smart watch and the smart phone.
For this, we utilized WEKA and it provides three types of
analysis - split percentage analysis, cross-validation analy-
sis, and supplied test set analysis. We chose 10 fold cross-
validation analysis to ensure that all the data was used for
both training and test. Thus, the error rate of the predic-
tive model would be minimized in the cross validation. In
Table 5, a detailed evaluation of different machine learning
algorithms is given for 6thSense. For Rule Based Learning,
6thSense has the best result for PART algorithm, which has
an accuracy of 0.98 and F-score of 0.80. On the other hand,
for Regression Analysis, we use the logistic function which
has high FPR (0.65) and lower F-score (0.49). Multilayer
Perceptron algorithm gives an accuracy of 0.9878 and F-
score of 0.80, which is higher than previously mentioned
algorithms. However, FPR is much higher (0.35), which is
actually a limitation for intrusion detection frameworks in
general. Compared to these algorithms, Linear Model Tree
(LMT) gives better results in detecting sensor-based attacks.
This evaluation indicates that LMT provides an accuracy of
0.99 and F-score of 0.972 for the smart watch.
From Table 5, one can also see performance of different
machine learning algorithms in 6thSense on a smartphone.
Here, LMT achieves the highest accuracy and F-score of
0.99 and 0.96, respectively. Multilayer Perception algorithm
also performs well with F-score of 0.82. However, false
positive rate is high in this algorithm which decreases the
performance. In summary, LMT works efficiently in both the
smart watch and the smart phone.
7.6 Comparison of Detection Methods
In this subsection, we give a comparison among the differ-
ent machine learning-based detection approaches tested in
6thSense for defending against sensor-based threats on the
smart watch and the smartphone. For all the approaches, we
select the best possible case and report their performance
metrics.
Table 6 depicts comparison among different detection
approaches on the smart watch. For Markov Chain-based
detection, we chose three consecutive malicious states as
valid device conditions. On the other hand, in Naive Bayes
approach, the best performance is observed for the thresh-
old of 60%. For other machine learning algorithms tested via
WEKA, we chose LMT as it gives highest accuracy among
other machine learning algorithms. These results indicate
that both Markov Chain and LMT provide high accuracy
and F-score compared to the Naive Bayes-based approach.
On the contrary, Naive Bayes model displays higher re-
call rate and less FNR than other approaches. However, the
presence of FPR in IDS is an issue to the system since FPR
refers to a malicious attack that is identified as a valid device
state. Both Markov Chain and LMT has lower FPR. Again,
as our dataset is imbalanced (number of benign activities is
higher than malicious activity), we chose auPRC as one of
the performance metric of 6thSense. From Table 6 we can see
that Markov Chain-based detection has the highest auPRC
(0.926) followed by LMT (0.892) and Naive Bayes (0.646).
In summary, considering F-score, accuracy, and auPRC of
all three approaches, we conclude that Markov Chain and
LMT both performs effectively for 6thSense.
In Table 6, we present a comparison of different ma-
chine learning-based detection techniques used in 6thSense
on the smartphone. Again, we chose the best possible
(Markov Chain, Naive Bayes, and LMT) cases for all of
the approaches and compare them in Table 6. Similar to
results in the smart watch, threshold for Markov Chain-
based detection is three consecutive malicious state. For
Naive Bayes-based detection, best performance can be ob-
served for 60% threshold probability. From Table 6, we
can observe that Markov Chain and LMT performs with
high accuracy and F-score compared to Naive Bayes-based
approach. Naive Bayes model also introduces high FP rate
(0.3) which indicates poor performance for IDS. On the
contrary, Markov Chain and LMT shows lower FP rate (0
and 0.0694 respectively). Again, from Figure 6d, we can
observe that Naive Bayes model has low auPRC compared
to Markov Chain-based detection in Figure 6b. LMT also
has high auPRC (0.91) which is suitable for our imbalanced
dataset. In summary, both Markov Chain and LMT performs
well for 6thSense on the smart phone with high accuracy, F-
score, and auPRC.
Performance
Metrics
Markov Chain
(Smart Watch|
Smart Phone)
Naive Bayes
(Smart Watch|
Smart Phone)
LMT
(Smart Watch|
Smart Phone)
Recall rate 0.9770 | 0.98 1 | 1 0.9998 | 0..998
False Negative
Rate
0.0230 | 0.02 0 | 0 0.0002 | 0.0002
Precision rate 0.9857 | 1 0.67 | 0.7 0.9458 | 0.9306
False positive
rate
0.0143 | 0 0.33 | 0.3 0.0694 | 0.07
Accuracy 0.9795 | 0.9833 0.9720 | 0.9492 0.998 | 0.9997
F-Score 0.9813 | 0.9899 0.80 | 0.8235 0.972 | 0.964
auPRC 0.926 | 0.947 0.646 | 0.686 0.892 | 0.91
TABLE 6: Comparison of different machine-learning-based
approaches proposed for 6thSense on Smartwatch and Smart-
phone (i.e., Markov Chain, Naive Bayes, and LMT).
7.7 Performance Overhead
As previously mentioned, 6thSense collects data in an An-
droid device from different sensors (permission and no-
permission imposed sensors). In this sub-section, we mea-
sure the performance overhead introduced by 6thSense on
the tested Android devices (smart watch and smartphone)
in terms of CPU usage, RAM usage, file size, and power
consumption. Table 7, Table 8, and Table 9 give the details
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of the performance overhead of 6thSense on the smart watch
and the smartphone.
For no permission-imposed sensors, the data collection
phase logs all the values within a time interval which causes
an increased usage of RAM, CPU and Disc compared to
permission-imposed sensors. For the power consumption,
we observe that no permission-imposed sensors use higher
power than permission-imposed sensors. This is mainly
because permission-imposed sensors are logic-oriented and
have lower sampling rate, which reduces its resource needs.
The overall performance overhead is as low as 5.5% of
Parameters Time
No-permission
imposed sensors
(Smart Watch|
Smart Phone)
Permission-imposed
sensors (Smart Watch|
Smart Phone)
CPU Usage N/A 5.5% | 3.9% 2.5% | 0.3%
RAM Usage
(MB)
N/A 17 | 23 11 | 14
Disc Usage
(MB)
1 min 4 | 6.5 0.001 | 0.001
5 min 7.5 | 9 0.001 | 0.002
10 min 10 | 12 0.001 | 0.003
Power
Consumption
(mW)
1 min 10.5 | 13.5 2 | 3.12
5 min 45.6 | 96.67 16.5 | 27.4
10 min 78.4 | 133.33 27 | 45
Power
Consumption
(without data
file)
1 min 1.32 | 2.68 0.1 | 0.23
5 min 8.7 | 23.4 2 | 9.63
10 min 32.56 | 55.35 9 | 17
TABLE 7: Performance overhead of data collection.
CPU, less then 17MB RAM space, and less than 10MB disc
space for the smart watch. Compared to the smart watch,
performance overhead for the smartphone is higher because
of higher number of sensors. Nevertheless, smartphone
offers more resources (CPU speed, RAM size, disc size) than
the smart watch which minimizes the effect of performance
overhead. Performance overhead for the smartphone is as
low as 3.9%, less than 6.5MB RAM space, and less than
12MB disc space. Thus, 6thSense’s overhead is minimal and
acceptable for an IDS system on current smart devices. One
of the main concerns of implementing 6thSense on smart
device is the power consumption.
Table 7 also shows the power consumption of the An-
droid app used in 6thsense. For one minute, 6thsense con-
sumes 10.5 mW power which increases upto 78.4 mW for
ten minutes on a smartwatch. For a smartphone, 6thSense
consumes upto 133.33 mW power for ten minutes. The main
reason of this high power consumption is that all the sensors
are kept on for the data collection and all the data are saved
on device for later analysis. To mitigate power-performance
trade-off, in practical settings, the data are not saved on
device rather a real-time analysis is done, which indeed
decreases the power consumption. Without saving the data,
the power consumption significantly becomes smaller. From
Table 7, we can observe that the power consumption of
6thSense becomes 32.56 mW which is almost 2 times lower
than otherwise on a smartwatch. For real-time analysis,
power consumption of 6thSense decreases 2.4 times on the
smartphone. As all the sensors do not have to remain on for
the analysis part, data can be observed if the smart device is
in unlocked status to lower the power consumption.
Moreover, for the data analysis phase of 6thSense, we
also implemented Markov Chain, Naive Bayes, and LMT-
based detection methods on the Android smartphone and
smart watch. Table 8 shows the performance overhead of
different detection techniques used in 6thSense on a smart
Parameters Markov Chain Naive Bayes LMT
CPU Usage 1% 1.5% 1%
RAM Usage 6 MB 10 MB 10 MB
Disc Usage
(For 5 Min)
<1 MB <400 kB <400 kB
Power
Consumption
(For 5 min)
1 mW 2 mW 2.5 mW
TABLE 8: Performance overhead of the data analysis phase in
6thSense on smart watch.
watch. All three detection techniques yield less than 2%
CPU usage and 10 MB of RAM usage. Note that we con-
sider the disc usage as a performance overhead for the
data analysis phase since results can be stored for further
performance evaluation of the framework. Our extensive
evaluation shows that the disc usage for the data analysis of
6thSense is less then 1 MB in all the three detection methods
for 5 minutes of analysis. Table 8 also provides the power
consumption of different detection techniques of 6thSense.
We can observe that the power consumption of the data
analysis phase is comparatively lower (less than 5 mW) than
the data collection phase of 6thSense. Finally, Table 9 shows
performance evaluation of different detection techniques
of 6thSense on an Android operated smartphone. 6thSense
performs with minimum overhead with less than 3% CPU
usage, 17 MB RAM usage, and 2 MB of disc usage. Power
consumption in the smartphone is also as low as 6 mW
for different detection techniques implemented on 6thSense.
In summary, different detection methods used in 6thSense
offer lower performance overhead in the system.
Parameters Markov Chain Naive Bayes LMT
CPU Usage 1.2% 2.5% 1%
RAM Usage 12 MB 15 MB 17 MB
Disc Usage
(For 5 Min)
<2 MB <1 MB <1 MB
Power
Consumption
(For 5 min)
4.5 mW 6 mW 3 mW
TABLE 9: Performance overhead of the data analysis phase in
6thSense on smartphone.
7.8 Power-efficiency trade-off
One major concern of implementing a security framework
in smart devices is power-efficiency trade-off. As smart
devices such as smart watch and smart phone are resource
constrained devices, an efficient security framework should
work accurately with limited resources. 6thSense uses all
the available sensors in a device to understand the state of
the device and detects sensor-based threat based on state
transition model. This can be a drawback in terms of power
consumption of the device. To address this limitation, we
performed a power-frequency trade-off study to determine
the working condition of 6thSense in real-life settings. Ac-
cording to Nielsen, average American adult spends around
3 hours everyday on their smartphone [59].
We consider this as an average time that 6thSense has to
run to detect any sensor-based threats in a smart device. In
Figure 7a and 7b, we illustrate the average power consump-
tion graph for 6thSense with different scanning frequency
in a smartphone and a smart watch, respectively. One can
notice that 6thSense consumes 310 mW power for scanning
continuously for 3 hours in a smart phone (Figure 7a).
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Average power consumption lowers to 234 and 174 mW
with 5s and 15s time interval respectively. For smart watch,
highest average power consumption for 6thSense is 220 mW
for continuous scan. Average power consumption becomes
as low as 174 mW and 148 mW for 5s and 15s time interval
respectively.
(a) (b)
Fig. 7: Power-frequency for (a) smart watch (b) smartphone
7.9 Discussion and Limitations
• Sensor-based threats in real-life settings: One limitation of
6thSense is the adversaries (sensor-based attacks) used
in the evaluation were constructed in a lab-environment.
Note that as of this writing there are no real sensor-
based malware in the wild. However, many independent
researchers have confirmed the feasibility of sensor-based
threats for smart devices [18]. Indeed, more recently, ICS-
CERT also warned the vendors and the wider commu-
nities about the possibility of exploiting the sensors of
a device to alter sensors output in a controlled way to
perform malicious behavior in the device [10]. Google
also acknowledges the sensor-based threats by restricting
sensor access for background apps in version of An-
droid [55]. To understand the sensor-based threats and
limitation of existing solutions, we built the proof-of-
concept versions of the sensor-based threats discussed in
Section 4. We also note that to ensure the reliability of
the malware (i.e., specific malicious Apps) for the threats
described in Section 4, we checked how they perform with
respect to the real malicious software scanners. For this,
we uploaded our malware on VirusTotal and tabulated
the results of the performance of 60 different malware
scanners available at the VirusTotal website in Table 10.
As seen in this table, the sensor-based threats are not
recognized by the different scanners. In conclusion, current
malware scanners are not aware of these threats yet and our
malware can be reliably used to test the efficiency of 6thSense.
Adversary Model Detection Ratio
Threat-1 0/60
Threat-2 0/60
Threat-3 0/62
TABLE 10: VirusTotal scan result for the adversary models.
• Power monitoring app: Different smartphone and smart
watch vendors offer power monitoring apps which moni-
tor running apps (both background and foreground apps)
and minimize the power consumption of the device. For
example, Samsung provides a power monitoring app
that prevents background apps to drain power. Power
monitoring apps activate sleep mode which disables the
updates and notifications for the inactive apps. This con-
flicts with the malicious apps described in Section 7.1.
However, the power monitoring app only works when
the app is in the background. If a foreground app has
malicious sensor logic, it can easily bypass the power
monitoring app and initiate an attack. As power mon-
itoring apps restrict important updates (e.g., messages
from text apps, alarm apps, etc.), users can turn-off or
modify this feature for convenience [60]. Moreover, the
smart watches do not have any power monitoring option
which makes them vulnerable to sensor-based threats.
In summary, power monitoring app can restrict sensor-based
threats to some extent, but can not nullify them entirely.
• New OS feature: Recently, Android introduced a new
version of OS (Android P) which restricts camera and
microphone usage if an app runs in the background. This
feature certainly acknowledges the sensor-based threats
and restricts sensor misuse in a smartphone. However,
Android P only eliminates one threat model described in
Section 4 and 7.1. Different malicious apps can still access
other sensors in the background and perform multiple
malicious activities. As explained in Section 7.1, Threat
Model-1 uses motion and light sensors which does not
have any conflict with Android P. Threat Model-2 uses
the microphone of a connected smart watch which by-
passes the security feature of Android P. Threat Model-
3 triggers the camera of a smartphone if all the other
sensors are inactive. Here, the malicious app opens the
camera in the foreground which is allowed by Android
P. We developed an updated version of this attack which
could start recording via microphone in a smart watch if
the connected smartphone was inactive and thus, bypass
the security feature of Android P. Again, Android P only
nullifies the threat if the app is installed in a smart phone.
A malicious app installed in a smart watch can trigger the
camera of a smart phone without any restriction. Also,
only 1% of Android-powered devices support Android P
currently which makes majority of the devices vulnerable
to sensor-based threats using camera or microphone sur-
reptitiously [61]. In short, even with the introduction of the
new OS, sensor-based threats can still affect normal operations
of the smart devices.
• Optimum scanning frequency: As smart devices are
resource-constrained devices, an optimum scanning fre-
quency is needed for 6thSense to lower the power con-
sumption of the device. In Section 7.8, we illustrated
that by scanning the sensors in fixed intervals (15s) and
unlocked states, power consumption can be lowered by
approximately 43%. However, some sensor-based threats
can bypass the lock state and perform malicious activities
in smart devices. To address this limitation, 6thSense can
use the context-aware model to detect the lock state of
the device and monitor limited sensors to minimize the
power consumption. As Android P is restricting some
sensors (microphone and camera), 6thSense can use this
feature and select limited sensors to scan in the locked
state. In short, performance of 6thSense can be configured in
terms of power consumption by selecting optimum scanning
frequency and combining with existing permission model of OS.
8 CONCLUSION
Wide utilization of sensor-rich smart devices created a new
attack surface namely sensor-based attacks. Accelerometer,
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gyroscope, light, etc. sensors can be abused to steal and leak
sensitive information or malicious Apps can be triggered via
sensors. Security in current smart devices lacks appropriate
defense mechanisms for such sensor-based threats. In this
paper, we presented 6thSense, a novel context-aware task-
oriented sensor-based attack detector for smart devices. We
articulated problems in existing sensor management sys-
tems and different sensor-based threats for smart devices.
Then, we presented the design of 6thSense to detect sensor-
based attacks on sensor-rich smart devices (smartwatch and
smartphone) with low-performance overhead. 6thSense uti-
lized different machine learning (ML) techniques to distin-
guish malicious activities from benign activities on a device.
To the best of our knowledge, 6thSense is the first com-
prehensive context-aware security solution against sensor-
based threats. We evaluated 6thSense on real devices with
100 different individuals. 6thSense achieved over 97% of
accuracy with different ML algorithms including Markov
Chain, Naive Bayes, and LMT. We also evaluated 6thSense
against three different sensor-based threats, i.e., informa-
tion leakage, eavesdropping, and triggering a malware via
sensors. The empirical evaluation revealed that 6thSense
is highly effective and efficient at detecting sensor-based
attacks while yielding minimal overhead.
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